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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Daniel Abram Taylor guilty of felony lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with five years fixed.  After Mr. Taylor filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(Rule 35) motion for a reduction of sentence, the district court granted the motion in part
and reduced the sentence to a unified term of fifteen years, with four years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Taylor asserts the district court erred when it admitted into
evidence a photograph of the alleged victim, because the photograph was not relevant
and the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value the
photograph might have had.  Mr. Taylor also asserts the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to place him on probation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Taylor by Information with one count of lewd conduct with
a minor under sixteen, felony, I.C. § 18-1508, for alleged conduct with his five-year-old
daughter, A.B.T.  (See R., pp.45-46; R., pp.110-11 (Amended Information).)  Mr. Taylor
entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.47.)
Mr. Taylor’s first jury trial ended with a hung jury.  (See R., pp.177-222.)  The
district court reset the case for trial.  (See R.,  pp.260-61.)   Unlike at  the first  trial  (see
R., pp.187-88), A.B.T. did not testify during the second trial.  (See generally Tr., pp.5-7
(list of witnesses at the second trial).)1
1 All citations to “Tr.” refer to the 962-page volume of the Transcript on Appeal, which
includes transcripts from the Motion Hearing held on August 25, 2014, the Jury Trial
2During the second trial, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Taylor and his ex-wife,
Ashley Felder, on A.B.T. being Mr. Taylor’s only biological child of their three children.
(See Tr., p.150, Ls.10-25, p.173, L.21 – p.174, L.8, p.753, L.17 – p.754, L.21, p.757, L.6
– p.758, L.6.)  Mr. Taylor testified that one day in Colorado, when he was talking to
Ms. Felder while he was holding her younger son, she tried to rip the child out of his
arms.  (See Tr., p.758, L.16 – p.759, L.4.)  He testified he pushed her away from him,
and she fell down the stairs and was injured.2  (Tr., p.759, Ls.4-5.)  Mr. Taylor ultimately
was convicted for misdemeanor domestic violence and child abuse in Colorado.  (See
Sealed Exs., p.150.)3
Mr. Taylor testified that he filed for divorce in Colorado.  (Tr., p.759, Ls.22-24.)
Ms. Felder filed a restraining order after the domestic violence, and he dismissed the
divorce case and reconciled to make sure the children had at least one stable parent.
(See Tr., p.759, L.25 – p.760, L.11.)  Afterwards, the family moved to Coeur d’Alene.
(Tr., p.760, L.12 – p.761, L.6.)  There, Mr. Taylor primarily worked as a teacher.  (See
Tr., p.158, L.23 – p.159, L.11.)  Mr. Taylor testified he later told Ms. Felder he was likely
going to file for divorce again, and Ms. Felder kicked him out of the house and got a no
contact order.  (Tr., p.761, Ls.7-20.)  Mr. Taylor then filed for divorce.  (See Tr., p.760,
L.12 – p.761, L.18, p.764, Ls.2-11.)
Mr. Taylor testified Ms. Felder filed a restraining order against him after he filed
for divorce.  (Tr., p.764, Ls.12-18.)  On cross-examination, Ms. Felder testified that after
held on November 30 through December 4, 2015, and the Hearing on Motion for New
Trial held on January 4, 2016.
2 Ms. Felder had told the police that Mr. Taylor hit her several times.  (See Sealed Exs.,
pp.153, 210-11.)
3Mr. Taylor filed for divorce, she told the Department of Health and Welfare that A.B.T.
had stated she would take baths with him.  (See Tr., p.181, L.17 – p.182, L.11; Sealed
Exs., pp.529-33 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 3-H, Report of Investigation).)  The Department of Health
and Welfare conducted a sexual abuse investigation, and no charges were filed.  (See
Tr., p.182, Ls.15-23, p.767, Ls.18-19.)
A couple months after the divorce, Mr. Taylor filed a modification request.  (See
Tr., p.163, L.14 – p.165, L.3.)  He sought to reduce his child support and alimony
payments.  (See Tr., p.166, Ls.17-22, p.768, Ls.2-13.)  Mr. Taylor and Ms. Felder went
into mediation.  (See Tr., p.166, Ls.11-16, Tr., p.767, L.25 – p.768, L.13.)
Meanwhile, A.B.T. had been seeing a psychologist, Dr. Sara Morrow.  (See
Tr., p.168, Ls.16-23.)  A.B.T. had been having problems with her bodily functions since
she was three or four years old.  (See Tr., p.169, L.19 – p.170, L.14, p.780, L.25 –
p.781, L.11.)  However, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Felder decided to send A.B.T. to Dr. Morrow
because she had been displaying oversexualized behavior at school.  (See Tr., p.168,
L.24 – p.169, L.8, p.783, L.10 – p.784, L.12.)
Ms. Felder testified that, a few days after the divorce mediator prepared a
modification agreement, she had a conversation with A.B.T.  (See Tr., p.167, Ls.7-12,
p.170, Ls.15-17; Sealed Exs., pp.498-500 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 3-C, the modification
agreement).)  Ms. Felder told A.B.T.’s psychologist about the conversation a couple
days later, and then the police contacted her.  (See Tr., p.170, L.18 – p.171, L.11.)  She
indicated, on cross-examination, that she knew Dr. Morrow was a mandatory reporter at
3 All citations to “Sealed Exs.” refer to the 617-page electronic PDF document, which
includes the Presentence Report and attachments.
4the time she called the psychologist.  (See Tr., p.187, Ls.8-22.)
On direct examination, Mr. Taylor testified Ms. Felder met with him in person
about the allegation.  (Tr., p.770, Ls.5-23.)  He testified Ms. Felder told him A.B.T. had
disclosed an inappropriate sexual event with him during a counseling session with
Dr. Morrow.  (See Tr., p.770, L.24 – p.771, L.7.)  When Mr. Taylor called Dr. Morrow,
Dr. Morrow instead stated Ms. Felder had told her what A.B.T. reportedly said.  (See
Tr., p.771, Ls.11-21.)
Ms. Felder testified she took A.B.T. to the Child Advocacy Center, for A.B.T. to
participate in an interview with Detective Shaw of the Coeur d’Alene Police Department.
(See Tr., p.171, Ls.8-19; Tr., p.242, Ls.9-14.)  On cross-examination, Detective Shaw
testified that in her initial contact, Ms. Felder told her that Mr. Taylor had inappropriate
intimacy with A.B.T.  (Tr., p.263, Ls.16-25.)  On direct examination, Detective Shaw did
not go into what A.B.T. told her, because that would have been hearsay.  (See
Tr., p.250, L.16 – p.251, L.4.)  Over Mr. Taylor’s objection, the district court admitted a
photograph, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, depicting Detective Shaw’s interview with A.B.T.  (See
Tr., p.250, L.11 – p.254, L.8; Sealed Exs., p.579 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 9).)
Dr. Morrow testified A.B.T.’s violations of space boundaries, toileting problems,
emotional meltdowns, and sleep disturbances were consistent with sexual abuse.  (See
Tr., p.365, L.7 – p.366, L.25.)  Dr. Morrow did not speak with A.B.T. directly about
sexual abuse.  (Tr., p.367, Ls.6-11.)  Another psychologist, Dr. Mary Dietzen, testified
for the State that, based on her review of the transcript of Detective Shaw’s interview of
A.B.T., the answers were consistent with someone who had not been coached.  (See
Tr., p.397, Ls.5-10.)
5On cross-examination, Ms. Felder testified that at the time A.B.T. reported the
sexual conduct at issue here, A.B.T. also stated she was mad at Mr. Taylor for giving
her gluten, which she was not supposed to have, and for saying something negative
about Dr. Morrow.  (See Tr., p.196, L.17 – p.197, L.6.)  Additionally, Ms. Felder testified
A.B.T. would sometimes tell big lies and not back down from her lies, even in the face of
punishment.  (Tr., p.189, Ls.9-17.)  On redirect examination, Ms. Felder testified she
delayed reporting her discussion with A.B.T. to Dr. Morrow because she was afraid
A.B.T. was not telling the truth.  (See Tr., p.227, Ls.3-9.)  Mr. Taylor testified A.B.T. was
“very, very elaborate and creative in telling stories,” she would sometimes be punished
for her lies, and she would, for the most part, maintain those lies.  (Tr., p.788, L.4 –
p.789, L.5.)
Detective Shaw testified she contacted Mr. Taylor after the interview with A.B.T.,
and had him come to the police department for an interview.  (Tr., p.255, L.4 – p.267,
L.5.)  She testified she told Mr. Taylor at the beginning of the interview he was free to go
at any time.  (Tr., p.257, Ls.3-8.)  The detective testified, on cross-examination, that it
“started out as an interview, and halfway through it turned into an interrogation when I
made the statement that I believe this has happened.  And then it turned into an
interrogation.”  (Tr., p.268, Ls.10-17.)
The State published a redacted version of the audio/video recording of Detective
Shaw’s interrogation of Mr. Taylor.  (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A; see Tr., p.257, L.12 – p.261,
L.1.)  The recording showed that Mr. Taylor initially denied being in the shower with or
sexually touching A.B.T., and he stated he did not remember anything happening in the
shower.  (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 17:45-18:00, 19:40-19:50, 31:35-31:55, 32:50-33:00,
633:40-33:55, 36:55-37:10.)  Detective Shaw stated something inappropriate had
happened (see Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 30:20-30:40, 31:45-31:50, 33:50-34:05), and that
Mr. Taylor was not being honest (see Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 33:20-33:40, 34:45-35:00).
She told Mr. Taylor, “[w]e need to make sure that you get the help that you need . . . or
whatever is required before you have your kids again.”  (Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 31:15-
31:25.)  The detective stated the concern was making sure it did not happen again and
that Mr. Taylor was safe to have his three kids.  (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 34:30-34:45.)
Mr. Taylor stated he thought A.B.T. had created this situation, and it did not
happen.  (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 41:50-42:05.)  He stated he could not imagine doing it.
(See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 52:00-53:20.)  However, about an hour into the interrogation,
Mr. Taylor stated he touched A.B.T.’s vagina with his penis, including slight penetration,
while they were in the shower at their house in Coeur d’Alene.  (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A,
54:15-1:01:45.)  After Detective Shaw told Mr. Taylor he was not being completely
honest (see Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 1:07:05-1:07:55), Mr. Taylor again described the genital-
genital contact (see Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 1:08:20-1:19:00).  Later, Mr. Taylor described the
sexual contact a third time, also stating that he touched A.B.T.’s vagina with his hands
as well as his penis.  (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1-A, 1:28:35-1:35:00.)
At the second trial, Mr. Taylor testified he never had any sexual contact with
A.B.T.  (See Tr., p.779, Ls.14-16.)  He testified he felt fine when he entered the
interview room, but left feeling like he was insane.  (Tr., p.778, Ls.13-21.)  His emotions
started to change during the interrogation when Detective Shaw let him know he would
maybe never see his kids again.  (Tr., p.778, L.22 – p.779, L.4.)   Mr. Taylor testified, on
7cross-examination, that the statements he made during the interrogation about sexual
contact with A.B.T. were not true.  (See Tr., p.808, Ls.4-11, p.808, L.22 – p.809, L.25.)
On cross-examination, Detective Shaw testified she had used some of the “Reid
technique” in interrogating Mr. Taylor.  (Tr., p.269, Ls.4-6.)  Dr. Bruce Frumkin, a
forensic and clinical psychologist (see Tr., p.422, L.21 – p.423, L.17), testified for the
State that Mr. Taylor was not more vulnerable to Reid technique interrogation tactics
compared with others, because the two-hour interrogation was within the normal time
range for interrogations, it did not appear Mr. Taylor was sleep-deprived, Mr. Taylor was
not of low intelligence, and nothing on the video recording indicated Mr. Taylor’s
memory was impaired.  (See Tr., p.442, L.15 – p.444, L.17.)  Dr. Frumkin testified the
interrogation did not cross a threshold that would have made it no longer legal to use
the techniques or tactics on display.  (See Tr., p.454, L.21 – p.455, L.7.)
However, Dr. Charles Honts, a professor of psychology (see Tr., p.545, L.3 –
p.548, L.18), testified for the defense that the interrogation displayed several Reid
technique risk factors for false confessions.  (See Tr., p.568, L.23 – p.569, L.4.)
Specifically, the interrogation featured a “false evidence ploy,” where Detective Shaw
stated she knew with certainty that the complaining witness was telling the truth, while
there was no way to know with certainty that any alleged victim was telling the truth
without a video recording of the alleged abuse.  (See Tr., p.569, L.6 – p.570, L.7.)  The
interrogation also had numerous instances of “minimization and justification ploys,”
where an interrogator would suggest there were explainable reasons for an act that
would minimize the seriousness of the act and justify it.  (See Tr., p.570, L.8 – p.571,
L.17.)  Dr. Honts further testified there were “false memory induction” activities in the
8interrogation, whereby people are convinced by the interrogation that they committed
the crime, and they come to believe they committed the crime.  (See Tr., p.572, L.3 –
p.575, L.18.)
The jury at the second trial found Mr. Taylor guilty of lewd conduct.  (R., p.423;
Tr., p.938, L.23 – p.939, L.3.)
Mr. Taylor filed a timely Motion for New Trial pursuant to I.C. §19-2406(4), (5)
and (6).  (R., pp.426-27.)  Among the grounds raised, Mr. Taylor asserted, “[a]
photograph of the alleged victim was admitted contrary to the Rules of Evidence.”
(R., p.426.)  After conducting a hearing, the district court denied the motion for a new
trial on all grounds.  (R., pp.433-36.)
At Mr. Taylor’s sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court
impose a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with ten years fixed.  (Sentencing
Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.18.)4  Mr. Taylor recommended the district court place him on
probation.  (Sentencing Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.21, L.17.)  The district court imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.  (R., pp.444-49.)
Mr. Taylor filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Sentence.  (R., pp.454-55.)  Mr. Taylor also filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.  (R., p.468.)  The district court, after conducting a hearing, issued an Order
Partially Granting Rule 35, and reduced Mr. Taylor’s sentence to a unified term of fifteen
years, with four years fixed.  (R., pp.474-75.)
4 All citations to the “Sentencing Tr.” refer to the 31-page transcript of the Sentencing
Hearing held on May 23, 2016.
9ISSUES
1. Did the district court err when it admitted into evidence a photograph of the
alleged victim?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to place Mr. Taylor
on probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Into Evidence A Photograph Of The
Alleged Victim
A. Introduction
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court erred when it admitted into evidence a
photograph of A.B.T. during her interview with Detective Shaw.  The photograph was
not relevant.  Even if the photograph were relevant, it should have been excluded under
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor.  The State will be unable to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility the
admission of the photograph contributed to the conviction.  Additionally, Mr. Taylor’s
motion for a new trial should have been granted on the basis the improper admission of
the photograph was an error of law.
During Detective Shaw’s testimony, the State sought to admit Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9,
a photograph showing how A.B.T. and Detective Shaw were positioned during A.B.T.’s
interview.  (Tr., p.251, Ls.7-23; see Sealed Exs., p.579 (Plaintiff’s Ex. 9).)  Mr. Taylor
objected.  (See Tr., p.251, L.24 – p.252, L.8.)  Outside the presence of the jury,
Mr. Taylor’s counsel asserted, “[t]he photograph has absolutely no relevance
whatsoever.”  (Tr., p.252, Ls.9-11.)  His counsel also asserted the State was “trying to
offer it because there’s a cute little girl sitting in there.  He’s trying to do nothing but
draw sympathy from the jury.  And there is an extreme danger that that’s exactly the
only thing that the jury would use that photograph for.”  (Tr., p.252, Ls.11-15.)
11
The district court overruled the objection: “It’s certainly not overly prejudicial.  And
based upon what we heard at the first trial, I think it does have some probative effect on
the issues regarding the interview.”  (Tr., p.254, L.24 – p.255, L.2.)  The district court
suggested the photograph was relevant to the methods by which Detective Shaw
conducted the interview with A.B.T.  (See Tr., p.253, Ls.21-23.)  The district court
therefore admitted the photograph.  (Tr., p.254, Ls.2-8.)  However, the photograph
should not have been admitted into evidence, because it was not relevant.  Even if the
photograph were relevant, it should have been excluded under Rule 403 because its
minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
B. Standard Of Review
An appellate court “freely reviews the question of relevancy as an issue of law.”
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).  “The trial court’s I.R.E. 403 determination
will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion.” Id.
When reviewing an exercise of discretion, an appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry into whether the trial court (1) rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
C. The Photograph Was Not Relevant
The photograph here was not relevant.  The Idaho Rules of Evidence define
“relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
12
than it would be without the evidence.”  I.R.E. 401.  Relevant evidence is generally
admissible, but “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”  I.R.E. 402.
The district court erred when it determined the photograph was relevant.  The
State argued the photograph was relevant to “whether or not this detective followed the
correct procedures when she gave the interview” (see Tr., p.252, L.23 – p.253, L.12), an
argument apparently adopted by the district court (see Tr., p.253, Ls.21-23).  However,
the photograph only captured a single moment during A.B.T.’s interview with Detective
Shaw.  Detective Shaw testified she believed the interview lasted about twenty-five
minutes.  (Tr., p.251, Ls.5-6.)  The photograph would not have depicted any procedural
or other irregularities that might have occurred during the rest of the interview.  It did not
have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that was of consequence to the
determination of the action, namely the methods the detective used, more probable or
less probable. See I.R.E. 401.  Thus, the photograph was not relevant to the
procedures by which Detective Shaw conducted the interview with A.B.T. See id.  The
photograph, because it was not relevant, should not have been admitted. See
I.R.E. 402.
D. The Photograph Should Have Been Excluded Under Rule 403
Even if the photograph were relevant, it should have been excluded under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor.  Thus, the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the photograph under Rule 403, because it did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards.
13
Rule 403 provides that, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  I.R.E. 403.  The Idaho Supreme
Court has explained that Rule 403 “creates a balancing test.  On one hand, the trial
judge must measure the probative worth of the proffered evidence.  The trial judge, in
determining probative worth, focuses upon the degree of relevance and materiality of
the evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to be introduced.” State v.
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603 (1991) (quoting Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,
110 (1987).  On the other hand, “the trial judge must consider whether the evidence
amounts to unfair prejudice.  Here, the concern is whether the evidence will be given
undue weight, or where its use results in an inequity, or as several commentators have
suggested, ‘illegitimate persuasion.’” Id. at 603-04 (quoting Davidson, 114 Idaho
at 110).
The Idaho Supreme Court in Rhoades acknowledged that “[a]ny evidence is
prejudicial to the party whose theory of the case it contradicts.” Rhoades, 119 Idaho at
604.  In the context of Rule 403, “[t]he proper focus of the trial court is upon ‘unfair
prejudice;’ whether fact to be shown by the evidence justifies the tendency of the
evidence to ‘persuade by illegitimate means.’” See id. (quoting Wright & Graham,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 5215, at 275.)  “In other words, evidence should be
excluded if it invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside of the evidence or
emotions which are irrelevant to the decision making process.” Id.
14
Even if it were relevant, any relevance the photograph in the instant case had to
the procedures used to conduct A.B.T.’s interview was minimal, because the
photograph only captured a moment in her twenty-five-minute-long interview with
Detective Shaw.  Conversely, the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor was great.
The photograph invited inordinate appeal to the jurors’ sympathy for A.B.T., an emotion
which was irrelevant to the decision making process.  As Mr. Taylor’s counsel’s
asserted, the State was “trying to offer it because there’s a cute little girl sitting in there.
He’s trying to do nothing but draw sympathy from the jury.”  (See Tr., p.252, Ls.11-13.)
Counsel further asserted, “there is an extreme danger that that’s exactly the only thing
that the jury would use that photograph for.”  (Tr., p.252, Ls.14-15.)  Thus, the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the minimal probative value of the photograph.
The photograph here invited inordinate appeal to the jurors’ sympathy, and the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its minimal probative value.  Thus,
the photograph should have been excluded under Rule 403. See Rhoades, 119 Idaho
at 604.  The district court abused its discretion when it admitted the photograph,
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115
Idaho at 600.
E. The State Will Be Unable To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That There
Was No Reasonable Possibility The Admission Of The Photograph Contributed
To The Conviction
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See
15
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  Mr. Taylor asserts
the State will simply be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility the admission of the photograph contributed to the conviction.
Thus, the judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded
to the district court for a new trial.
F. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor’s Motion For
A New Trial
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a new trial, because the motion should have been granted on the basis the
improper admission of the photograph was an error of law.  One of the grounds for a
new trial Mr. Taylor asserted was that “[a] photograph of the alleged victim was admitted
contrary to the Rules of Evidence.”  (R., p.426.)  At the hearing on the motion for a new
trial, Mr. Taylor asserted the photograph came into evidence “over objection with
absolutely no probative value.  It was intended solely to draw sympathy from the jury.
Frankly, it did just what it was intended to do.  It had no probative value.  The unfair
prejudice [was] substantial.”  (Tr., p.951, Ls.17-22.)
The district court, in denying the motion on that ground, determined, “[a]s far as
the photo of the alleged victim, it seems to me that it was harmless certainly.  Did show
the circumstances surrounding the interview.  It was nothing prejudicial to the defense in
presenting that.”  (Tr., p.960, Ls.11-15.)  However, the motion for a new trial should
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have been granted on the basis the improper admission of the photograph was an error
of law.
The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008) (citing State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577
(Ct. App. 2007)).  A trial court may grant a new trial, on a defendant’s motion, “if
required  in  the  interest  of  justice.”   I.C.R.  34.   Idaho  Code  §  19-2406  contains  the
permissible grounds for a new trial, which include “[w]hen the court has misdirected the
jury in a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any question of law arising during
the course of the trial.”  I.C. § 19-2406(5).  The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that
“the admission of irrelevant evidence would be an error of law—one of the statutory
grounds for a new trial.” State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 397 (Ct. App. 2000).
For the reasons discussed above in Section I.C., the photograph was not
relevant.  Thus, the district court’s admission of the irrelevant photograph was an error
of law. See Carlson, 134 Idaho at 397.  The district court therefore should have granted
Mr. Taylor’s motion for a new trial. See I.C. § 19-2406(5).  By denying the motion for a
new trial, the district court abused its discretion, because it did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards. See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.  Thus, the order denying
the motion for a new trial and the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the
case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Place Mr. Taylor
On Probation
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it, despite his
recommendation, failed to place him on probation.
“A trial court’s decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is
appropriate is within its discretion.” State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278 (2002).  Before
imposing a sentence, a district court must consider the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521
regarding whether a defendant should be placed on probation. Id.  “A decision to deny
probation will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is consistent with the criteria
articulated in I.C. § 19-2521.” Id.
Section 19-2521 provides that a sentencing court
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without
imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of
the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for
protection of the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in
the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
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I.C. § 19-2521(1) (emphasis added).  Additionally, while not controlling the discretion of
the court, the following grounds
shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment:
(a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm;
(b) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten harm;
(c) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(d) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the
defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(e) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of the crime;
(f) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that was sustained; provided,
however, nothing in this section shall prevent the appropriate use of
imprisonment and restitution in combination;
(g) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or
has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the
commission of the present crime;
(h) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances
unlikely to recur; [and]
(i) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that the
commission of another crime is unlikely.
I.C. § 19-2521(2) (emphasis added).  However, a district court need not “recite the
statutory criteria of I.C. § 19-2521, or its application of the facts to those criteria in
rendering its decision on probation.” Reber, 138 Idaho at 278.
Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards when it failed to place him on probation, because it did not
adequately consider factors falling within the criteria of I.C. § 19-2521.  Specifically, the
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district court did not adequately consider Mr. Taylor’s low risk to the community.
Mr. Taylor had a LSI-R score of 12.0.  (Sealed Exs., p.188.)  The presentence
investigator stated that score “indicates he is a low risk to reoffend based on the
criminogenic and protective factors in his life at present.”  (Sealed Exs., p.168.)
The district court also did not give adequate consideration to the fact that the
present charge is Mr. Taylor’s first felony.  While Mr. Taylor had prior convictions in
Colorado for misdemeanor domestic violence and child abuse (see Sealed Exs., p.150),
as well as a Colorado conviction for misdemeanor violation of a protective order (see
Sealed Exs., p.151), the present charge is his first felony conviction (see Sealed Exs.,
pp.149-53).
Further, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Taylor’s support from
his friends and family.  In a letter of support, Mr. Taylor’s stepfather, Michael Lowery,
wrote that Mr. Taylor “was an exemplary role model and mentor to many children,
youth, and young adults through his community involvement.”  (Sealed Exs., pp.244-
45.)  Mr. Lowery asked the district court to “apply a fair sentence which allows Dan to
continue to function in society, earn an income and continue to be with friends and
family.”  (Sealed Exs., p.245.)
Mr. Taylor also submitted multiple letters of support from his friends.  For
example, Tracey Vaughan, who directed two plays that Mr. Taylor acted in, wrote she
had always known Mr. Taylor “to be an upstanding citizen and someone who ‘did the
right thing’ in multiple circumstances.  He is a great person who has contributed a lot to
our local community in many ways.”  (Sealed Exs., p.239.)  Meghan Ferrin, who had
known Mr. Taylor for over twenty years, stated Mr. Taylor “was the kind of teacher who
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kids remember, who they later say shaped their lives, their interests, their pursuit of
education.”  (Sealed Exs., pp.234, 237.)  Kathy Dennis, whose sons had been members
of a youth swimming team with Mr. Taylor, wrote, “[k]nowing both sides gives me the
ability to tell you that I do support Danny to this day.”  (Sealed Exs., p.243.)
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Taylor’s plans to
continue to contribute to society in the future.  Mr. Taylor had earned two master’s
degrees in education and educational/leadership/curriculum instruction.  (Sealed Exs.,
p.159.)  At the time of sentencing, Mr. Taylor was in the process of earning a third
master’s degree, in environmental sustainability.  (See Sealed Exs., pp.158-59.)  At the
sentencing hearing, Mr. Taylor indicated he was pursuing the third master’s degree
because “I have a lot to give.”  (See Sentencing Tr., p.22, Ls.12-15.)  He stated, “I’ve
got so many more things to do in this life.  I’ve got so many more things to—to give to
people, to provide, both with friends and family, as well as the greater community.”
(Sentencing Tr., p.22, Ls.7-10.)  Mr. Taylor told the district court, “[t]here’s a lot of—a lot
of ills in this world and I—I have the skills and the knowledge necessary to make things
better.”  (Sentencing Tr., p.22, Ls.17-19.)
Mr. Taylor submits that, in light of the above mitigating factors falling within the
criteria of I.C. § 19-2521, district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards when it failed to place him on probation.  Thus, the district court abused its
discretion.  The district court should have followed Mr. Taylor’s recommendation by
placing him on probation.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Taylor’s respectfully requests this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction, or vacate the district court’s order denying his motion for a new
trial and the judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court for a new
trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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